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# Governance Structures in the American Academy and Their Impact: A Report from the 2001 Survey of Higher Education Governance 

by

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## INTRODUCTION

Institutional governance lies, if not at the heart of the academic enterprise, then at its origin. Before today's universities or colleges began to operate, they received a charter from the state, established by-laws, and appointed trustees or directors of the enterprise (Hall, 1997). Colleges and universities pursue their activities under the auspices of and with the support of the state because they are understood to be public trusts and to be pursuing the advancement of the public's general welfare. Governance is the means by which both the public trust may be monitored and its general welfare can be implemented.

The concept of governance encompasses the explicit, and occasionally implicit, arrangements by which authority and responsibility for making decisions concerning the institution is allocated to the various parties who participate in it (Hirsch \& Weber, 2000). In higher education, the governance system consists of "the written and unwritten policies, procedures, and decision making units that control resource allocation within and among institutions" (p. 5, Benjamin, 1993). Among colleges and universities, authority and de jure control over the institution ultimately rests with the board of trustees, but they often delegate components of this authority to others within the institution such as administrators, faculty, and committees that often are comprised of students, staff and alumni as well.

All organizations must solve the challenge of governance. How they address this challenge will depend upon their legal status: whether they are public or private, whether they operate for profit or not, and upon the legal requirements placed on them by their charter and the contracts into which they enter (Weeks \& Davis, 1982). In the for-profit corporate setting, the analysis of governance is often confined to the study of the governing board and its relations with top executives (Fama \& Jensen, 1983a \& 1983b; Lorsch, 1989). In higher education, the delegation of the board's authority to parties such as faculty, students, alumni and others requires that the analysis be much broader and encompass the formal and informal interrelations of these parties. The academic practice of shared governance characterizes the complex managerial character of higher education institutions and helps to distinguish them from other organizations in other industrial sectors. While the patterns of delegation and practices of shared governance are neither absolute nor uniform in American higher education, understanding how governance is defined and implemented on college campuses constitutes an essential project for understanding the behavior of higher education organizations. Despite the importance of this project and growing interest in governance, broad and systematic study of governance practices in higher education has been a neglected area of research.

This paper describes the findings of a recent national survey of higher education governance practices and the implementation of shared governance concepts on a large number of colleges and universities. It examines the kinds of institutions employed for enacting shared governance and their incidence. It attempts to analyze how power is distributed among organizational participants and the factors that might account for variation in these distributional patterns. The paper also presents some preliminary findings concerning the relationship between particular governance practices and institutional outcomes and performance. Some of the questions used in this survey were drawn from past studies of academic governance in the hopes that by comparing answers from the present with those from the past we could learn something about how governance has changed since these studies were last conducted. The survey also included questions developed in context of the current challenges facing institutions in order to subject some of the current governance literature to preliminary evaluation. The findings presented here and the study discussed on these pages are not the definitive word on the current state of higher education governance in America nor do they pretend to be. Scores of questions about governance and its practice remain unanswered, but the evidence presented here marks a first step in a long series of necessary strides which must be made in the understanding of academic governance. One clear conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is the need for continued examination of the issues raised here and for continued questions concerning the formal and informal processes which surround decision-making and institutional action.

## BACKGROUND

Understanding and attending to the implementation of governance among colleges and universities is an essential project for scholars of higher education everywhere, but it is particularly important in the context of American higher education because America's is not a centralized system of post-secondary education. The sector's achievement of the public good is understood to emerge from a plurality of autonomous activity set within a federalist political framework and embedded in a market context that places primacy on the consumer's sovereignty. The absence of centralized planning over the system, the broad range of conceptualizations of the public good, and the variety of ways in which these concepts are pursued is a uniquely American phenomenon and has been a prime strength of the system, endowing it with rich financial resources, freeing the institutions for innovation, and generating responsiveness to social and economic needs. But, as with any investment tool, past performance is no guarantee of future returns. Even if society feels it cannot control each institution, it does expect that the sector's output and functions will conform to social expectations, attain at least minimal social objectives, and employ resources efficiently.

What do we know of shared governance today? Unfortunately, not nearly enough to attend to the policy challenges at hand. The salience of public concern for higher education issues has made academic governance a central issue in policy debates and provoked much public discussion about the relationship between institutional performance and current governance practices. Nevertheless, much that gets written about higher education rests on anecdote or, at best, a handful of case studies of governance at a small number of institutions. The various criticisms of governance - that it has become too corporate and capitalistic or that it is too arcane in its traditions and unresponsive to the demands of the modern world - circulate in an environment distinguished by a dearth of systematic and comprehensive information.

The early 1970s witnessed a flurry of scholarly focus on academic governance with much of this interest coming from sociologists. ${ }^{1}$ Between 1969 and 1971 the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) conducted a national survey of institutions with AAUP chapters and asked faculty and administrators to rate faculty participation in a variety of decision areas. Around that time sociologists Seymor Lipset, Talcott Parsons, Gerald Platt and Martin Trow, were compiling their own studies of decision processes. Much of this research provided the foundations for many of the central ideas and contributions of modern organizational sociology. No major comprehensive study of governance practices among both private and public institutions of higher education has been conducted since that time. There have been a few smaller scale studies of decision making in small sub-groups of the higher education population but nothing on so broad a scale that it cuts across the sector and across ownership types. But no study has facilitated comparison of public and private institutions and provided insight into the

[^1] functioning of governance at all levels including the interface of students and administrators, faculty and administrators, boards and presidents.

## ISSUES OF INTEREST

To close this information gap, the 2001 Survey of Higher Education Governance was devised as an effort to revisit and replicate some of the earlier surveys while at the same time developing from contemporary ideas questions that would shed light on current implementation. The goals of this survey were multifold. The prime objective was to provide and assessment of the state of governance today. What are the relationships among the groups involved in governance on a campus? What institutions or decision-processes are used to implement governance and do they fall into particular types? How are the institutional structures of decision distributed across the higher education sector and do particular organizational traits account for any pattern in this distribution? How broadly diffused are particular governance practices and suggested innovations or reforms in shared governance?

The survey instrument also sought to provide data on the distribution of power among various parties on a campus. Power can lie in formal structures that grant authority but it can also stem from one's social position in the broader milieu, access to alternative opportunities, ability to produce resource flows for the institution, and the professional authority and expertise one wields (Pfeffer \& Salancik, 1978; Emerson, 1962; Dahl, 1957, French \& Raven, 1968). Scholars can use participants' perceptions of how power is allocated to determine whether the locus of power corresponds to the kinds of decisions and resource allocation patterns that an institution favors.

By incorporating questions from past studies of governance, such as the AAUP's 1971 survey, the data made an effort to facilitate comparisons across time, to identify which institutions experienced changes in their governance, the direction of the changes (who gained and who lost influence), and what institutional traits or market circumstances may have accounted for these developments. The expansion of information, the explosion of knowledge in the sciences, the development of new fields like computer science, and the increasing professionalization of the undergraduate curriculum pose numerous challenges for higher education. How do organizations that face particular environmental pressures respond with changes in their decision structure? How does their response influence the relationship of parties on the campus? Which institutional types have been successful at meeting the challenges thrust before them? Have they been able to contract effectively and reallocate resources? The survey paid particular attention to the question of change and adjustment.

## PROBLEMS IN STUDYING GOVERNANCE

Perhaps one reason for the dearth of large-scale survey work in higher education governance stems from the particular challenges involved in using questionnaires to gain a picture of decision practices from campus to campus. All surveys must surmount the common problems of sampling work, but what would a survey of governance need to remain cognizant of before it began? The most obvious challenge facing any study of governance is the problem of specification error: attempting to measure a concept or phenomenon that is ill defined or not measurable. The study of higher education governance is prone to specification error for five essential reasons.

First, governance on a college or university campus is difficult to study systematically because decision-making may not appear to function as a systematic process (Cohen \& March, 1974). Governance structures and decision processes are rarely delineated with the same clarity and precision as political systems operating at a national or local level. Before questions about governance can be developed, all the permutations by which a decision can be reached must be considered.

Secondly, even when rules of decision are clearly specified, they may differ from the actualities of power's exercise. Questions that ask respondents to specify the written rules regarding a decision process, and the procedures that need to be followed in decision making may miss the reality of campus government. Third, it may be difficult to separate the board's legal authority over all decisions from the assigned responsibilities over particular decisions. The concept of academic governance embraces the notion that power, governance, and decisionmaking are shared tasks and responsibilities which can be allocated in various ways, but in legal terms, legal authority and responsibility for all decisions ultimately rests with the board. Specifying where responsibilities for budgets, degrees, curriculum, and other decisions lie may prove difficult for those who understand the boards formal responsibility but recognize the role of other groups.

Fourth, groups in higher education may not carry the clear and contradictory objectives of political models. Even if power over long range budget planning rests in one institution with the faculty governing body while in another it rests with the administration, each institution can develop identical goals if faculty and administrators share common interests or values. Although faculty and administrators often do clash over some decisions, they often share similar values and goals and also can possess common beliefs about what actions or policies are unacceptable. Even governing boards may take their cues about goals and values from the faculty, making it difficulty to distinguish between institutions with strong governing boards and those without.

Finally, any efforts to gauge shared governance and determine faculty influence must make clear how faculty power will be recognized. The case of tenure illustrates this problem. Political models might suggest that a campus where all faculty members receive tenure when eligible was a campus captured by the faculty. However, some of the most elite institutions rarely grant tenure to junior faculty, yet the faculty still possesses a great deal of authority and power over decisions. Faculty power in governance is often difficult to assess because most faculty members remain uninterested in the powers that have been delegated to them under the rules of governance on the campus and reserve their authority merely for cases in which they feel the administration or board over-stepped their bounds.

## SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Reliability, accuracy, validity of the data, and consistency of responses within an institution depend on whether respondents have accurate information to respond to the questions asked, have the same understandings of the questions as the survey author, and are not influenced in their responses by the survey instrument. To assess the quality of the instrument and verify the value of the collection methodology, cognitive interviews were conducted with a small sample of administrators and the survey instrument pre-tested at a handful of institutions in an urban area. Such site interviews are a recommended way of protecting against measurement error in survey work (Biemer \& Fesco, 1995; Singer \& Light, 1990). Fifteen administrators and senior faculty at five different institutions were consulted and asked to provide answers to each survey question in an oral interview. This small sample consisted of the same kinds of individuals who would be responding to the survey nationally. Discussions involving each question were used to develop clarifying language that matched a question's aim with the understandings of the concept expressed by administrators. The responses that were provided in these interviews were then tabulated to see whether they were consistent across the administrators at the same institutions - do people see things in the same way - and whether the answers given were accurate - did responses match the information about the institution that was publicly available. The answers proved very consistent and well within the $90 \%$ range. By checking answers with what could be learned by reading information about the institution available in campus publications, by-laws, and published on web sites, it appeared that the consulted group possessed accurate information about governance at their institution.

Getting accurate data is always difficult when one relies on one individual or several to report on the characteristics of a social collective such as complex as a university or college. Nevertheless it is a standard method in the study of large organizations to rely on one "expert" respondent (Knoke, et. al., 2000). The findings from the on-site cognitive interviews generated a high level of confidence that this technique would yield valuable institutional data.

In order to generate confidence that the data produced is truly representative of the sample population a survey must obtain an adequate response rate and protect against sampling bias. The 2001 survey was more of a census than a sample since every 4-year institution accredited to grant bachelors degrees in the liberal arts was asked sent a survey. Special efforts were made to obtain a high response rate by following the Tailored (or Total) Design Method (TDM) for survey research recommended by Dillman and colleagues (Dillman, 2000 \& Paxson,

The 2001 survey used the National Science Foundation's CASPAR database to generate a listing of the 4-year institutions in the US that were accredited to grant bachelor's degrees in the liberal arts. ${ }^{3}$ Matching this list against an address list from the Higher Education Directory Publications, Inc generated a sample population of some 1300 institutions. To encourage participation by institutions, several prominent groups in higher education were approached for sponsorship and support. ${ }^{4}$

Following the TDM protocols, members of the sample population received an introductory letter informing them of the survey, a survey packet with a copy of the survey, a return envelope, and an instruction letter, and 2 email reminders before the survey deadline. Respondents had the option of a web based reply. All correspondence was personally address to survey participants. Letters were sent to campus presidents and AAUP chapter heads. The president was asked to fill out the survey or pass it on to a senior and trusted member of the

[^2] administration whose views corresponded to the president's and whose knowledge of governance matched that of the campus CEO. The letter also asked the president to identify a faculty member with seniority and knowledge about governance and to pass along survey packet and request that faculty representatives fill in their part of the survey.

## SURVEY FINDINGS

These efforts resulted in a successful survey project with an institutional response rate of almost $70 \%$. Table 1 shows how closely the population of survey respondents matched the survey universe of possible respondents. The survey results presented here are drawn from a survey population of 1321 4-year institutions. The survey consisted of two parts. The first section consisted of questions about the institution's administrative structure and governing board and was to be completed by campus administrators. The second section concerned the implementation of shared governance and was to be filled out by both faculty representatives and administrators. A total of 903 institutions submitted at least one reply, with the vast majority of institutions supplying responses from both faculty and administrators. The overall response rate was $68.4 \%$.
[Table 1 about here]

The breakdown of responses from public and private institutions matched the general population of institutions quite well. 350 public institutions are included among these respondents and 553 private institutions. Public institutions comprise $37.4 \%$ of the population of institutions sampled and they comprised $38.76 \%$ of the institutions that responded to the survey. The participant institutions' general characteristics also mirrored those of the sample population, with similar percentages of Carnegie-classified research institutions, liberal arts colleges, and comprehensive institutions. Regional breakdowns also supported the finding that the survey population matched that of the general population of schools. Non-respondents, however, could not be described as random or nonsystematic. In other words, even though the responding institutions mirrored the general institutional population, the likelihood that an institution did not respond to and participate in the survey was not the same as the likelihood that an institution did choose to participate. Non-respondents were not similar to the general population of institutions. For instance, the fraction of liberal art II colleges among non-respondents was almost $38 \%$ but they only comprised $32 \%$ of the population of institutions. Institutions from the Rocky Mountain and southwest regions were slightly less likely to participate than their counterparts in other regions while those in the Great Lakes area were slightly more likely to respond. ${ }^{5}$ The mean combined SAT score of participating schools was slightly higher than the full population, as was the likelihood that the institution had a medical school. But the average faculty salaries and the proportion of tenured faculty on the payrolls at both sets of institutions were strongly similar.

## The State of Shared Governance

The picture painted by the survey findings is generally more favorable than either critics of shared governance or defenders of shared governance usually admit. Most critics of shared governance tend to complain that it rarely functions well in practice, slows decision-making, and impedes necessary reorganizations and strategic change. Advocates who defend shared governance often voice concern that it faces increasing pressures for centralization and for more

[^3] top-down, bureaucratic and corporate forms of organization. The evidence produced here does not invalidate the claims of critics or advocates but it does indicate that problems associated with encroachments on the traditions of shared governance or with its unresponsiveness represent a minority of cases or situations. The survey found scant evidence that shared governance poses widespread problems to effective management nor did it find a broad consensus around this idea among any group, including administrators.

Respondents also expressed a positive view of relations between faculty and administrators and, if few respondents rated the faculty's participation in governance enthusiastically, neither did they express great concern. Table 2 a summarizes some basic questions that highlight the state of relations on campus. On a scale from 1 to 5 , faculty participation was rated 3.3 on average. This score was lower among public institutions and highest among private liberal arts colleges. The high scores among the smaller schools are likely due to the closer relations between faculty on such campuses and the manageability of smaller decision groups. Administrators were slightly more positive about faculty participation and AAUP chapter members tended to be the most negative. Despite the insistence of critics that the faculty stymies administrative action and is unwilling to participate in and make tough decisions, administrative respondents tended to view the implementation of shared governance more positively than faculty.
[Table 2a about here]

The same attitudes emerged when respondents were asked to categorize relations on campus between faculty, governing boards, and administrators. $53 \%$ of respondents rated the governance environment between faculty and administration as cooperative and another $41 \%$ characterized relations as collegial with occasional conflicts. Only $6.5 \%$ of respondents expressed concern that the governing environment could be best categorized as suspicious and adversarial. These numbers were consistent across several different institutional types with the large private institutions indicating the least cooperative environment and the liberal arts colleges appearing to be the most cooperative, but the difference between these extremes was not large. When these characterizations of campus relations are broken down by respondent group, there are some discrepancies between the sanguinity of the faculty and that of the administration. $62 \%$ of administrators were apt to see relations as generally cooperative while only $47 \%$ of representatives from the faculty shared this view. Among survey respondents from AAUP chapters, the charity of this view dropped even further, falling to only $28 \%$ of respondents who felt relations were cooperative. Clearly, AAUP representatives possessed the dimmest view of relations on campus and this could be either because people with concerns about relations between faculty and administration are drawn towards participation in the AAUP or because the AAUP often finds itself in conflict with campus administrations.

Other indicators of relationships on campus also indicated relative stability. The number of presidents was similar across institutional types. On average, campuses reported having had about 4 presidents over the last 30 years, for an average tenure of 7.5 years. Some campuses reported more turmoil at the top but a small minority. $82 \%$ of campuses reported less than 5 presidents and $92.5 \%$ reported less than 6 . While faculty unions are quite common among public institutions most public institutions remain non-unionized. Despite the limitation on organizing among faculty at private institutions, $6 \%$ of private institutions continue to recognize faculty unions. Most unionization activity occurred prior to 1990 with $90 \%$ of collective bargaining units beginning before 1990. Since then, unionization has persisted at a steady low annual rate.
[Tables 2b \& 2c about here]

Respondents were asked to evaluate how the relative formal powers of a number of participant groups had change in the last two decades. Table $2 b$ reports the average evaluation of how power changed for each of the groups by institutional type. Despite fears among some faculty that shared governance is at an ebb, few institutional types reported significant deterioration in the power of any group. Although department chairs and faculty governance bodies were judged to have lost the most power, faculty governance bodies were also identified as the most significant gainers of power after deans and other division heads. Table 2c reports information from the same set of questions but breaks down answers by respondent group. Faculty respondents were more likely to see their authority as deteriorating in recent years, particularly those who were responding to the survey on behalf of an AAUP chapter. Although only $26 \%$ of AAUP representatives felt faculty authority had deteriorated in the last two decades, this compared with $11.5 \%$ of faculty governance body representatives and $3 \%$ of administrators. While faculty tended to be more pessimistic than administrators are in this regard, few of the survey responses indicated widespread faculty concern about their authority in governance. ${ }^{6}$ Faculty respondents were more likely than administrators were to view boards and presidents as having assumed more power in the last 20 years. Faculty saw presidents and boards assuming more power over the last 20 years and faculty governance bodies as having less authority, however $90 \%$ of respondents from faculty governance bodies rated their faculty as having either more or as much power as they had 20 years ago.

[^4][Table 2d about here]

One fear often expressed by the defenders of shared governance, is that executives from outside of academia, from both the military and the business world are being brought in to run colleges and universities with a more business-like focus and bureaucratic orientation. By choosing executives who lack academic experience, governing boards may be seeking to instill a business acumen in the management of the institution or to build links to communities outside the college walls. Despite some expressed concerns that the boards of many institutions have recruited chief executives with little experience in academia, most colleges and universities continue to be headed by individuals with a substantial academic background. Table 2 d shows that the chief executive at $70 \%$ of institutions has a doctorate degree. $47 \%$ of college presidents have a Ph.D. in a liberal arts field. Another 26\% have advanced degrees (either a Ph.D. or an Ed.D.) in education. $6 \%$ have a Ph.D. in theology. This distribution of backgrounds was consistent across both public and private ownership forms. Public universities, private universities and liberal arts colleges had roughly a similar distribution of degree experiences among their chief executives. However, the percentage among liberal arts colleges hid a cleavage among two classes of such colleges. The small colleges categorized as Liberal Arts II (LA2) colleges by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education were the least likely to report a president with a Ph.D. Furthermore, while $62 \%$ of LA1 colleges were headed by someone with a P.D in the liberal arts, only $39 \%$ of the LA2 institutions were headed by someone with a similar background. If non-academic executives are migrating anywhere it is to those smaller private colleges which currently face some of the most severe economic challenges (Brenneman, 19xx).

Many of the executives, in addition to their scholarly education, served as faculty members themselves prior to assuming their leadership positions. Over $61 \%$ of college and university presidents had also served as tenured, full professors prior to becoming a chief executive. However, the presidents of public institutions tended to be drawn from faculty ranks more often than those in the private institutions. $77 \%$ of chief executives of public institutions had previously served as tenured full professors while only $56 \%$ of the chief executives at similarly sized private institutions had such backgrounds. Among the liberal arts colleges this number dropped even more, with less than $50 \%$ of the presidents of such institutions coming from the academic ranks. Again, the institutions in the LA2 category were the least likely to have a chief executive who previously had a tenured faculty position.

## The Locus of Authority

Shared governance, although it takes different forms and is expressed through different kinds of governing structures, seems to function well at many of the institutions surveyed. Respondents expressed a belief that faculty governance bodies had a significant impact on the policy making process on campus and participation in decisions seems to be fairly well distributed among all of the different groups except for students. Table 3a records responses to several questions about influence and decision-making broken down by institutional type. 84\% of respondents indicated that they felt the main representative body of the faculty either influenced or directly made policy at the institution. Faculties at public institutions were judged slightly less influential than those of the private institutions. Faculties at the liberal arts colleges were judged the most influential. Faculty are considered less influential at the private research universities than at their public counterparts.
[Table 3a about here]

Table 3a also indicates that the locus of budget activity is generally seen as resting with the president and the deans. Almost $70 \%$ of respondents saw the president as playing a major role in budget making and $81 \%$ of respondents felt that the deans participated a great deal in the budget process. Faculty might play some role in budget making but at almost half the institutions they did not get identified as having much influence. In budgeting the faculty at private research institutions were again seen as having the least amount of influence after students. Faculty influence in budget matters tended to get expressed at the institutional level, most likely through the governance bodies, rather than at the departmental level. Department chairs play an important role in the budget process and appear to be even more prominent than the governing boards, but they assume a secondary role to higher level administrators. The boards of private institution often draw fire for being less proactive and supervisory than their public counterparts boards (Ehrenberg, 2000). Interestingly, the governing boards at public institutions are seen as having less influence over budget matters than those of private institutions. Governing boards are most active in the smaller colleges. Their participation in budgetary decisions among the private research institutions mirrors that of the public institutions.
[Table 3b about here]

Once again, administrators were more likely to judge faculty participation and influence in budget matters more optimistically than faculty. Table $3 b$ shows that compared to AAUP chapter respondents, administrators rate the influence of the faculty governing body as greater, see boards and presidents as having less of a budgetary role, and see faculty as having more of a role in budgeting. Compare the response of the AAUP chapters (highlighted in gray in Table 3b) with those of administrators concerning the role of department chairs and of faculty at the department level. Faculty members were twice as likely as administrators to see the role of faculty at the department level as advisory in budget matters. Administrators were $50 \%$ more likely to see faculty at the institutional level as having some role in budget making.

Still, when asked to characterize faculty participation in a number of decision areas, faculty and administrators tended to ascribe similar distributions of authority to faculty across 15 major decision areas. Table 3c reports summary statistics from responses to the survey questions borrowed from the 1970 survey of the AAUP. Respondents were asked to classify the faculty's participation in 15 different issue areas according to a system of 5 categories (described in the appendix at the back) by estimating the percentage of faculty whose participation took each of the five forms. ${ }^{7}$ Two of these categories reflected a significant role for faculty - full determination by the faculty over a matter and joint action between administration and faculty. The percentage of faculty respondents supplied for these categories were combined for each respondent and then averaged to yield the faculty participation scores shown in Table 3c.
[Table 3c about here]

Faculty authority appears to reside in the areas that both faculty and the AAUP have traditionally felt were the domain of academics - degree requirements, curriculum tenure, appointments and degree offerings. Faculties appear to play a much smaller role in decisions regarding the size of disciplines, the setting of budgets, determining salaries and salary scales, and planning for construction projects. Faculty are described as playing a somewhat greater role in decisions about teaching loads, in the selection of deans and department chairs, and in the

[^5] shape that faculty governance takes. Still, the percentages of faculty who get classified either under the categories of faculty determination or joint action when added together do not reach $50 \%$, meaning most of the authority over these areas resides with either the administration or the governing board. These answers are relatively consistent across institutional types with only a few exceptions. In question 10, faculties in liberal arts colleges appear to participate less in the appointment of department chairs. The faculty at public institutions seem to play a greater role in financial planning and policy matters (Note the averages for questions 11 and 12).

The responses provided by faculty representatives and administrators corresponded fairly well and once again, AAUP chapter members take the dimmest view of faculty participation in each of these decision areas. Faculty and administrators provided similar characterizations of the faculty's role in setting degree requirements. Administrators on average estimated that $90 \%$ of the faculty on their campus either had sole determinative authority over degree requirements or shared this authority jointly with the administration. This corresponds with the appraisal of faculty representatives who estimated on average that $87 \%$ of the faculty played such a role in setting degree requirements. Faculty governance representatives and AAUP chapter members who responded to the survey tended to give similar estimates of faculty participation in the areas of faculty appointments, appointments of the dean, decisions about salaries and selection of faculty representatives to governance bodies. Faculty representatives and administrators tended to provide similar estimates for the appointments of department heads, setting of degree requirements, establishing faculty authority in governance, and curriculum decisions. The sharpest disparities between the responses of faculty members and administrators appear to be in the area of appointments, campus construction projects, appointments of the academic dean, and the setting of teaching loads.

## Institutions of Governance: Board Practices

Neither the fondest hopes of governance efficiency advocates such as the Association of Governing Boards (AGB), nor the worst fears of shared governance champions such as the AAUP. Such groups make frequent prescriptions for effective governance practice with the AGB focusing on practices of governing boards and AAUP attending to institutions of faculty governance and the relations between administrators and faculty. A series of questions relating to the practice of institutional governing boards and concerning the institutions of shared governance were included in the survey questionnaire and are discussed here and in the next section.
[Table 4a about here]

Proponents of reforms in the area of governing boards often call for shrinking the size of boards to make them more effective and for stocking them with individuals who do not have direct, participatory connections to the institution. A particular policy recommendation is that faculty and students not serve on governing boards. Table 4a reports summary statistics from several questions about board practices. Almost $30 \%$ reported that faculty or students serve as voting members of the governing board and this number rises to $54 \%$ among public institutions. Private institutions appear to be more reluctant to allocate board seats for either faculty or students. When board seats are reserved for inside members, it is most often for students, and typically, these are the seats reserved for student representatives from the student governing association. Only $1.4 \%$ of respondents reported that their institution had scaled back either student or faculty representation in recent years. Boards tend to meet quarterly among the private institutions (an average of 3.3 board meetings a year) and more often among the public institutions. Private institutions appear to do more business through the executive committees since these appear to meet more frequently, most likely because these groups are smaller and represent a more tractable number of individuals. Presidents of public institutional boards rarely participate in board meetings with voting privileges, however, they are active members of governing boards $61 \%$ of the time among the private institutions. Table 4 a also appears to indicate that presidential voting rights are more common among the larger private institutions. $67 \%$ of the institutions classified as comprehensive by the Carnegie coding system report that the president serves as a voting member of the board.

Other criticisms regarding effective governance by boards concern minimizing board size and controlling the appointment process. Public institutions appear to be more closely adhering to the admonition of board efficiency advocates to keep board size small. The average size among public boards (13.18 members in Table 4a), however, is still larger than what proponents of effective board practices call for (typically 8-10 board members). The average size of governing boards across the higher education sector is 25 members and this number derives from the significant size of private boards. Some private boards can grow quite large and one in fact reaches to over 100 members. The average size of private institutional governing boards is about 32 members. Such boards appear to fulfill a dual purpose, functioning both as fundraising tools and as governing apparatuses. Board seats can be used to reward large donors and they can be used as donor recruitment tools, which build connections to funding communities or individuals and invests particular parties with a strong interest in the welfare of the institution.

However, proponents of effective board practice also call for strict rules regarding the setting of board size. Appointments to the governing board can be used to maintain control over decision-making. A voting block can maintain its influence by appointing board members sympathetic to its views when board size is not prescribed and regular rules for appointment are not in place. $84 \%$ of institutions report that the number of members is prescribed either in the institutional charter, in the by-laws or by state statute. Table 4 b reports data concerning the appointment process. Here there are clear differences between private and public governing boards. $90 \%$ of the institutions report that board appointments are performed by state officials. Among the private institutions, about $90 \%$ of appointments are actually made by the board. The other significant designators of board members are church bodies, who play a significant role in the appointment of board members among private liberal arts colleges.
[Tables $4 \mathrm{~b} \& 4 \mathrm{c}$ about here]

Public institutions can range in their degree of public-ness. Some can resemble state agencies in the way they handle resource allocation and compensation. Others may look more like their private institutional counterparts. Table 4 c reviews some of the characteristics of governing boards and their authority at public institutions. $20 \%$ of institutions reported that they were overseen by a statewide board and $46 \%$ reported that the president dealt most frequently with a governing board that oversaw a system of state institutions. Campus based boards are most involved in governance at $35 \%$ of the public institutions and a similar number report that tuition levels get set by the institutions governing board. The faculty are considered to be employees of the state at $48 \%$ of the institutions. Tuition revenues are most often retained by the institution for its own use but a significant proportion report that such monies are deposited into state accounts and must be re-allocated by either a state board or the legislature.

## Institutions of Governance: Administrative/ Faculty Relations

If governing boards have yet to realize the goals of efficiency advocates, governing bodies of the faculty seem to adhere closely to some of the recommended guidelines of documents in the AAUP Redbook. ${ }^{8}$ Table 5a indicates that $60 \%$ of institutions reported that administrators do not have a vote in the faculty governance body and $73 \%$ report that an administrator or chief executive does not chair the governing body meetings. Note also that these figures are somewhat depressed by the responses from the smaller institutions such as the liberal arts colleges where administrators are more directly involved with faculty governance and work more closely with the faculty in governing matters. Administrators are active in the faculty governance bodies of such institutions, both chairing them and serving with voting rights, about $50 \%$ of the time. Among the larger institutions, administrators' tend to be much less involved in the functioning of governance bodies. Contrary to the recommendations of groups such as the AGB, faculty leaders in the bargaining unit are also allowed to serve on the campus' faculty governance bodies in about $90 \%$ of all cases where faculty are unionized.
[Table 5a about here]

In many instances both private and public institutions appear similar in the nature of faculty authority. As Table 3c showed above, the governance bodies are seen as having similar kinds of influence on policy. Among public institutions, the faculty's authority in areas such as budgeting, academic matters and strategic planning essentially mirrors that of the private institutions. The first three columns in Table 5 b indicate that the modes by which faculty express influence are similar in both pubic and private institutions. Faculty influence, however, is felt most often at the institutional and division level among private institutions and at the departmental and institutional level among the public institutions. As the middle column of

[^6] Table 5 b shows, appointments to the faculty governance bodies occur according to this pattern as well with most of the action occurring at the division or institutional level in private institutions and greater activity at the departmental level among the public institutions. Private institutions, according to the last column of this table have the broadest enfranchisement polices for faculty. Private institutions are more likely to award voting rights to all full-time instructional faculty while public institutions will tend more towards granting such rights to tenure and tenure track faculty members only.
[Tables 5b \& 5c about here]

How do the structures of faculty governance differ across public and private institutions? Table 5 c indicates that faculty governance structures take quite different forms at public and private institutions. Table 5 c seems to indicate that among private institutions faculty influence is less structured while governance among the public institutions appears to be more formalized. Faculty senates are twice as likely on a public campus than they are in a private institution. The holding of full faculty meetings occurs on half the fraction of public campuses as on private campuses. Among the universities in the sample, both private and public, faculty senates remain the preferred way of organizing faculty governance. The faculty serve as members on key campus committees such as academic policy, budget, promotion and employment policies on $98 \%$ of campuses, a figure that is roughly similar across both private and public institutions. Faculties appear to have a key role in major decision areas at most institutions.

## The State of Governance Reforms

The challenges facing higher education today are much discussed and reforms in the area of academic and management policy are commonly proposed. The professionalization of the role of president is apparent in the high incidence of training presidents receive. Table 6a indicates that the presidents of public and private institutions receive some kind of further and formal training after assuming the presidency in almost $90 \%$ of the cases. An interesting finding from this table is seen in the incidence of training among the leaders of institutions that the Carnegie commission classifies as Research 1. The heads of these large, complex, and multipurpose institutions are most often drawn from the ranks of the professorate (see Table 2d) but they are also the least likely to receive any kind of formal training for their role as president. Most institutions also report that they monitor and compare their performance relative to that of a peer group of institutions, indicating that competitive and social pressures may lead institutions to closely mimic the behavior and decision patterns of like institutions (DiMaggio \& Powell, 1983).
[Tables 6a and 6b]

What is the status of two current hot-button issues in governance and administration -post-tenure review and merit pay? $56 \%$ of institutions have instituted some scheme of merit pay. $63 \%$ have implemented some kind of system for conducting post-tenure reviews. These two policy innovations in academia appear to be quite widespread, perhaps surprisingly so, given faculty opposition and resistance to these ideas, but they are still not fully pervasive. Tenure is quite common, appearing in $90 \%$ of the institutions that responded to the survey but is least likely among the liberal arts colleges. Formal statements about academic freedom are nearly universal. The diffusion of merit pay and post tenure review policies makes for an interesting display of the kinds of social differences that seem to exist across geographic areas of the United States. Merit pay and post-tenure review are least likely in the states of the northeast and the Great Plains, regions where the older land grant colleges and more traditional institutions are quite common. The policies are most common in the southern states and the Rocky Mountain region. This pattern is a likely indication that the traditions of academia are least diffused and that concerns about performance and minimal expenditures are greatest in these regions. Since the private sectors in these states are also smaller, taxpayer concern over the spending of tax dollars probably leads to pressure for policies that are seen as a way of monitoring the faculty.

## Meeting the Challenges Facing Liberal Arts Colleges \& Universities

Data discussed above indicated that non-academic presidents were most common among the smaller liberal arts colleges. The turn towards non-academic presidents underscores the financial concerns that often face smaller, less well-known liberal arts colleges (Brenneman, 19 xx ). This finding generated the hypothesis that executives of such institutions were brought in to help meet these challenges with alternative leadership. How have institutions managed the complexity of a rapidly evolving world of knowledge and challenging economic environment? Has outside leadership positioned smaller institutions so that they can face these threats or spurred significant change among these institutions?

The survey indicated that a significant proportion of institutions appear to be able to flexibly adapt to changing circumstances and successfully re-organize departments or recruit high quality faculty, even if it results in income disparities within departments. Table 7a shows that efforts to transform the faculty and improve quality in particular areas were most common among universities. Surprisingly, public research universities were more likely to report that they would recruit outside faculty, even if it meant paying a higher salary. By contrasting the numbers for the private sector as a whole reported in column 3 with those for private universities in column 4, it appears that the liberal arts colleges are the least likely to engage in activity aimed at improving their academic standing or enhancing faculty quality. $50 \%$ of institutions report that bringing in outside senior faculty at higher salary levels would generate significant pressure to increase salaries for existing faculty and reduce any disparities. Respondents from public institutions report greater pressure for faculty salary equalization then those from private institutions, but at least half of all institutions responding indicated that faculty recruitment could generate pressure for across the board raises. Perhaps the small size of liberal arts college faculties and the importance of collegiality in governance at such a scale make these institutions reluctant to invite any turmoil associated with competitive faculty recruitment.
[Table 7a about here]

Closing and merging departments offers institutions a way to get a handle on changing student demands, developments in disciplinary knowledge, and the need to transfer resources from one subject area to another. Half of all institutions reported that they had closed a department in the last 5 years. Data from the survey shown in Table 7 b indicate that private universities were the most likely to have closed a department. Surprisingly, despite whatever challenges they face, liberal arts colleges were the least likely to have closed a department. Such colleges were far less likely to close a department and closed on average only 1.2 departments. Again, this may be a function of their size. Since they have fewer departments to close, they should be less likely to have successfully closed a number of departments over the last five years. Given that this group of institutions was also less likely to participate in the survey, this evidence should be of some concern for it is at least indicative of the particular tensions and pressures which beset these institutions in the current economic climate. The small size of the faculty and the fear of upsetting any collegial balance may also play a role here.
[Table 7b about here]

What reasons do institutions give for closing departments and what factors do they report make this task most difficult? The survey asked institutions reporting a department closure to select from a number of choices some reasons such change was most necessary and most difficult. The survey data from reported experience with department closures was particularly informative with regard to the barriers that stand in the way of reorganizations. Despite claims that tenure presents significant challenges for colleges that want to strategically re-orient themselves, administrators were actually less likely than faculty to feel that tenure posed a significant challenge to reorganization strategies and to department closures. Even among faculty, less than $7 \%$ felt that tenure made closures or reorganizations more difficult. However, most respondents agreed that faculty opposition to such a change posed the most significant barrier to reorganization and closures. Student concerns also appear to play a role in making such change difficult, particularly among the private institutions. Despite their large size and the strong influence of outside political pressure on the behavior of public institutions, the public institutions were more likely to report faculty resistance would make such change difficult. Of course, they were also more likely to have undertaken closures. The evidence from private universities, however, indicate this may be a function of size or mission, since they report roughly similar numbers. As the public sector tends to have much larger institutions and is mostly comprised of universities that may lead to the more common report of faculty resistance as an obstacle. Faculty resistance was less likely to be reported by the liberal art colleges.

Enrollment pressures and direction from a governing board are the most common reasons for departmental closures and reorganizations. Liberal arts colleges that closed departments or programs were more likely than their larger counterparts (both public and private) to do so as a result of enrollment pressures or under direction from the board. While faculty resistance to the closure was less likely to be a significant factor preventing closures on such campuses, student opposition was more likely to be reported as an obstacle at the smaller institutions. Among the reasons that made such change most necessary, however, student concerns were least often listed by respondents from liberal arts colleges. Much more commonly mentioned among such schools were enrollment levels, highlighting the particular circumstances that challenge such institutions. Boards also appear to be more actively involved in such decisions at the smaller institutions.
[Table 7c about here]

How and why do institutions respond to student concerns and stated needs? The survey included a question on this subject and the findings listed in Table 7c highlight that market pressures are keenly felt among institutions of higher education. Responding to perceived market influences is reported to be the dominant reason for institutional response to felt student needs in both public and private institutions. Almost $50 \%$ of all institutions and over $50 \%$ of private institutions report that they respond to felt student needs most often in response to pressures communicated to them through the market-place. And, unsurprisingly, institutional responses to student needs and demand are more likely to be market-driven among the private institutions, while public institutions are more likely than private institutions to make such accommodations in response to demands from the student representative body. In sharp contrast to what the experience of institutions 30 years ago must have been, schools rarely respond that they make changes in response to student protest or petition. About a quarter of institutions answered that attempts to meet student demands were taken in response to none of the three listed possibilities. Cognitive interviews conducted to test the survey instrument prior to sending it out indicated that most administrators who chose the option 'none of the above' felt their institutions made such changes out of consideration for what they believed was in the best interests of students.

What then do colleges and universities set as their major goals and what policies emerge from these governing structures? The survey asked administrators to report on the three main goals of the mission statement or most recent strategic plan. Each of these responses was read and categorized among 35 different policy goals. ${ }^{9}$ Among the 35 categories, three goals occurred far more frequently than the other identified institutional objectives; raising academic quality, encouraging enrollment growth and improving facilities and technology were the most frequently identified goals of institutional respondents. Academic quality was twice as likely to be mentioned as the other two and almost three times as likely to be mentioned as the next most popular goal.
[Table 7d about here]

These 35 categories were then reviewed to detect any commonalties among them.
Despite the large number of categories generated, six thematic areas emerged from this effort that cut across all of the categories: a focus on quality, concern for enrollment, attention to financial performance and efficiency, greater responsiveness to the demands of the market, a focus on traditional academic values, and maintaining public service oriented policies. Table 7d lists the breakdown of these themes by institutional type. Improving the quality of the institution and attracting more students to the campus were the most commonly described institutional objectives. This broad consensus seems to cut across all the institutional types in the sample, but

[^7] quality concerns were most pronounced among the public institutions and the private research and doctoral granting universities. When the improvement of financial performance is added to this mix, the three goal-categories account for $80 \%$ of the objectives listed by survey respondents. ${ }^{10}$ Enrollment was least likely to be a reported institutional objective by the research private institutions. Public institutions were far more likely than private institutions to report concerns for and objectives pertaining to public service. Liberal arts colleges were the least likely to include public service type objectives among their listed goals. Financial and management concerns were, as would be expected, most commonly listed by these smaller institutions. Such schools were also more likely to include traditional values, either of an academic or a spiritual nature. The concern for the traditional study of the liberal arts is an inherent mission of such institutions but the large proportion of religiously affiliated institutions among this groups are also factors that explain the concern for traditional spiritual values as well.

## Changes Since 1970

The survey included questions from 1970 AAUP survey in order to see how governance has evolved and, in particular, to see whether it had deteriorated in the face of a more challenging economic environment. Market pressures are said to be eroding the institutional commitment to shared governance and the willingness of administrators and boards to include faculty in tough decisions, to either wait for them to make decisions or to be confident that they can make choices which are in the institution's best interest (cite Nelson in CHE). The increasing mobility of faculty and their tendency to award their loyalty to their discipline rather

[^8] than to an institution is said to have eroded faculty commitment to contributing to shared governance (Lodge, 19xx). Did the survey uncover findings to verify these claims? Not at all. [Table 8a about here]

Table 8a lists the mean responses to the fifteen questions that correspond to the categories and responses described earlier in Table 3c. The last two columns of Table 8a compare the mean responses about faculty participation at a matched set of institutions whose responses were available from both the 1970 and the 2001 survey. Comparing responses from Table 3c and column one in Table 8a, it is apparent that the matched schools merely verify that the differences highlighted here are not a function of different survey samples. Several areas draw immediate attention. The most striking finding is that in all cases, the mean level of faculty participation in the 15 decision categories is reported to have increased. ${ }^{11}$ Striking increases in faculty control and authority over decision areas are evident in the area of appointments and promotion, setting the size of the disciplines, appointment of academic deans and department heads, and deciding on the authority and membership of faculty governance agencies. The faculty role in financial planning and policy also increased since 1970, however, only a fraction of faculty appear to be involved with much authority in these areas even today. Change did not seem to occur in two areas. The percentages of faculty reported to have authority over academic operations appear to be roughly similar across the 3 decades. In 1970, $83 \%$ of faculty played a determinative or joint role with administrators in the setting of degree requirements and deciding on the curriculum. This number rose modestly to about $90 \%$ in 2001 . Decisions about the types of degrees offered seem to be made in a similar fashion to the approach of 30 years ago. Faculty played almost no role in decisions about building and facility construction then and they continue to play a small role today.
[Table 8 b about here]

Table 8 b provides a breakdown by categories for faculty participation types for each of the fifteen questions. It provides the average percentage provided by respondents for faculty participation under each of the five categories. Descriptions of the categories are available at the back of this document in a glossary provided with the tables. Table 8 b also allows a comparison between estimates provided in 1970 and those provided for the most recent survey effort. Recall that respondents were given with a list of 15 decision areas and asked to estimate the fraction of faculty at their institutions whose participation in the decision area took each of five possible decision styles. The five categories of decision style ranged from full faculty determination to no participation whatsoever. In some cases faculty might share authority jointly with a board or with the administration. In others, these groups might consult with the faculty prior to taking action or might merely discuss agreed upon policies with the faculty post-hoc. The average percent of faculty participation under each decision style is listed in the cells and placed next to the corresponding average from the 1970 survey.

The patterns revealed in Table 8a are confirmed by this more detailed analysis of the ratings provided by survey respondents. Faculty authority appears to have increased in the last 30 years. The cells in the table are shaded to provide a visual representation of the balance of authority over an issue. The cells are arranged in descending order from the most faculty

[^9] authority on the left to the least on the right. Moving from the left, the decision categories at which at least $50 \%$ of the faculty participate with that much authority or more are shaded in gray. A measure for faculty authority can be visualized as the length of the white boxes for each row. And the degree of administrative or board control over an issue is indicated by the length of the gray bars formed by the shaded cells for each row. For instance, for the two questions concerning academic operations, decisions about curriculum and setting degree requirements, faculty authority is quite significant and more than half of faculty are classified as having full determinative authority over these issues.

The lengths of the shaded cells and of the white cells provide a visual representation of the balance of authority over issues in this area. Correspondingly, faculty authority in financial planning issues is quite minimal and the shaded gray cells indicate the strength of board or administrative authority in this area. Shading the cell a slightly darker color when the $50 \%$ threshold is reached also affords an opportunity to compare the point at which the $50 \%$ mark was reached in 1970 and in 2001. Greater faculty authority is indicated by a decrease in the length of the gray bars. In all cases, the $50 \%$ mark was reached under a greater class of faculty participation in 2001 than in 1970. Most faculty get classified under either the joint action category, meaning they share joint authority with administrators and boards, or under the consultation category, meaning the faculty gets consulted before major decisions but the decision may or may not reflect faculty views. Faculty appear are rarely involved in academic planning or financial planning. Decisions about faculty status and academic operation seem the primary responsibility of the faculty, just as they appear to have been in 1970. The overall picture is one of stability with some change in the direction of greater faculty authority. Whether this represents a diminution of the situation 15 years ago, in the mid-1980s, is not clear. But by looking over a longer term, it does appear that faculty participation in decisions has expanded.

## CONCLUSIONS

Despite much current concern among both faculty and observers of higher education about the state of shared governance, the data collected here depicts an image neither as cumbersome and unloved as some critics seem to believe, nor as threatened and supplanted as some advocates seem to fear. Faculty seem to have a significant role in governance at many institutions. Their participation appears to be valued. Few administrators suggested that faculty governance presented a significant obstacle to effective governance. The data indicate that faculty have significant authority in those decision areas where faculty claim the greatest expertise and tend to demand that their voice should be preeminent. Faculty seem to have a strong influence on decisions in the area of curriculum, degree requirements, appointments and promotions, and in determining the arrangements of shared governance. Budget making, strategy, and construction plans seem to remain the realm of administrators and boards.

While the faculty's role seems healthy, faculty respondents were clearly less satisfied with matters than administrators, or at least they expressed less sanguine appraisals of their participation. Faculty respondents tended to grade their participation and influence more conservatively than administrators rate faculty influence. Of course, administrators also seemed to feel that they had less influence than faculty tended to ascribe to them. These perceptions are consistent with the common observation made of higher education that all groups ascribe to others more influence than those groups ascribe to themselves. No one seems to think they have enough influence and everyone seems to feel others have more influence than may be the case.

In assessing perceptions of power the important question becomes "power relative to what?" Without a clear standard or measure of power it is difficult if not impossible to draw conclusions about whether individuals or groups have sufficient or appropriate levels of power and influence. Those who have high standards for the degree of power they want to wield may express low assessments of their influence and dissatisfaction with the system.

One conclusion that is possible from analysis of the data is that relative levels of power have changed over time. Data from the survey indicate that the sector is not without disturbance or transformation. Some institutions have seen significant turmoil at the executive position. Efforts to impose management tools that assess performance and outcomes have made headway. Among the public institutions, the epicenter of influence appears to have shifted somewhat in the direction of boards and executive officers. Still, comparisons of the 2001 survey data with the data gathered thirty years ago suggest that faculty participation in a number of decision areas has expanded. What is more, despite a great deal of talk in policy circles about change, many of the traditions and practices of shared governance continue as they have in the past. The survey uncovered little evidence that proposed changes in governance or suggested policies regarding participation and voice have made much headway. Liberal arts colleges, despite facing some of the most significant challenges in the sector, also appear to have avoided rapid or drastic change. Despite their importation of non-academic leadership, the survey data indicate that they shy away from efforts to improve their competitive position by attracting better faculty and have had the least experience with re-organizations and department closures.

While governance clearly affects the kinds of choices an institution faces and the decisions it makes, the survey also highlighted that other factors can matter as much or more. Among them, mission, size, market pressures, and a school's market niche all seem to shape the adoption of particular policies. The similarity of responses from private and public research universities suggests the importance of mission in shaping the choice and decision structure. While some academics continue to resist treating higher education as a market good, market pressures appear to be real factors that affect institutional decision-making and that account for variation in institutional approaches. The survey data reviewed here pointed out clear differences in policy and in governance structures among institutions that found themselves in different markets, serving different clientele, and having different kinds of market opportunities.

None of this should be surprising for economic analysts of the sector. However the survey did produce a number of findings that might upset some of the priors an economist might bring to an analysis of governance. For instance, we might expect to observe more faculty control at private institutions because the public's ownership of state institutions should provide incentives to situate strong powers with governing boards, institute systems of monitoring, and impose rules that shift the locus of power away from faculty and towards the public. This did not appear to be the case. Control mechanisms and structures for faculty participation took different forms but the ascribed levels of faculty influence were not significantly different between private and public institutions. While dependence on the market for tuition paying students may reduce faculty influence and account for a narrowing of discrepancies between public and private institutions, even those institutions with strong market positions such as the Research 1 and Liberal Arts 1 institutions did not distinguish themselves by having extraordinarily strong faculty governance structures.

We might also expect that faculty would more successfully resist the importation of new management techniques like post tenure review and merit pay if the governance structure granted them significant powers or if the faculty's reputation afforded them significant options in the faculty labor market. The data did show that in some cases faculty power, both structural and market-based, are correlated with a lower incidence of adoption of policies such as merit pay. However, private research universities, which should be associated with the most faculty power and the greatest market flexibility, were among the most eager adopters of such management methods. Perhaps this apparent atrophy of collective efforts in faculty governance at research universities confirms that when markets provide exit power to organizational participants, their interest in the expression of power from voice deteriorates (Hirschman, 1970)

The increasing competition for students, the demand from students for training that prepares them for $21^{\text {st }}$ Century job opportunities, and the budget constraints that often limit the growth opportunities of public institutions might also suggest private institutions would be more aggressive in their pursuit of quality. Whether in fact a rank divergence between public and private institutions has appeared is a question for another paper, but from the data reported here, it does not seem that public institutions have been less aggressive in their pursuit of faculty or in their concern for quality. The respondents from private institutions certainly expressed greater sensitivity to market factors in their responses; think of how respondents characterized their reaction to student needs. Public institutions, though, appeared more aggressive in faculty hiring policies. To ascertain whether the differences indicated here among ownership forms and institutional types persist would require analysis that controls for other sources of variation among institutions, but the survey does suggest such an investigation would be worth-while.

A number of reasons may possibly explain this convergence over the pursuit of quality despite different kinds of budget constraints. First, a popular idea often expressed among state politicians is that higher education can be an important engine of economic growth. It may help train a skilled work force for the state if college graduates can be retained and it may produce economic activity that spurs growth in area such as biotechnology, medicine and computers. such as these possible for this. As long as actions can be justified on this basis politicians may support them. Secondly, it may be that such actions represent a mechanism for institutional selfdefense. A university with national prominence and reputation may provide a kind of inoculation against budget incursions from politicians.

Of course another way to defend an institution is to have effective governance structures that assure the public and the politicians that institutional decision-making is efficient, effective, responsive to environmental imperatives, cognizant of the public's interests, and mindful of the institution's long-run interests. Perhaps no amount of reform and adjustment can assure the public that shared governance is an effective and important means of guiding these complex and important institutions. But winning the public's confidence will require institutions to both pursue greater transparency in their decision making and clearer delineation of responsibilities. Faculty participation in governance need to be boosted so that governance bodies can confidently assert they reflect the faculty's interest and best judgments. To do so will require real and perhaps costly measures that make genuine the oft promised but rarely enacted idea that tasks other than research will be considered in professional promotion and rewarded in practice. Any reform effort will have to overcome the inertia of participants in shared governance whose implicit motto seems to be "upset no one. Most importantly, true progress in reform and in public persuasion can only occur when more research, both thick description and comprehensive data, is available concerning the relationships between practices and institutions of shared governance and organizational performance.

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TABLES
Table 1
Survey Response

|  | Sample | Population |  | Sample | Population |  | Sample | Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total Number Inst. Resp. Rate | $\begin{gathered} 903 \\ \mathbf{6 8 . 4} \% \end{gathered}$ | 1321 | Research I | $\begin{gathered} 69 \\ 7.6 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 88 \\ 6.6 \% \end{gathered}$ | New England | $\begin{gathered} 76 \\ 8.4 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 114 \\ 8.6 \% \end{gathered}$ |
| Public | $\begin{gathered} 350 \\ 38.8 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 494 \\ 37.4 \% \end{gathered}$ | Research II | $\begin{gathered} 33 \\ 3.7 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 39 \\ 3.0 \% \end{gathered}$ | Mid East | $\begin{gathered} 172 \\ 19.0 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 255 \\ 19.3 \% \end{gathered}$ |
| Private | $\begin{gathered} 553 \\ 61.2 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 821 \\ 62.6 \% \end{gathered}$ | Doctoral I | $\begin{gathered} 28 \\ 3.1 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 44 \\ 3.3 \% \end{gathered}$ | Great Lakes | $\begin{gathered} 156 \\ 17.3 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 215 \\ 16.3 \% \end{gathered}$ |
| Medical School | $\begin{gathered} 84 \\ 9.3 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 112 \\ 8.5 \% \end{gathered}$ | Doctoral II | $\begin{gathered} 41 \\ 4.5 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 55 \\ 4.2 \% \end{gathered}$ | Plains | $\begin{gathered} 96 \\ 10.6 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 147 \\ 11.3 \% \end{gathered}$ |
| Mean SAT | 965 | 958 | Comp I | $\begin{gathered} 282 \\ 31.2 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 419 \\ 31.7 \% \end{gathered}$ | Southeast | $\begin{gathered} 238 \\ 26.4 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 335 \\ 25.4 \% \end{gathered}$ |
| Prop Tenured Faculty | 56.2\% | 55.9\% | Comp II | $\begin{gathered} 57 \\ 6.3 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 86 \\ 6.5 \% \end{gathered}$ | Southwest | $\begin{gathered} 58 \\ 6.4 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 100 \\ 7.6 \% \end{gathered}$ |
| Avg Faculty Salary | \$40,786 | \$40,364 | Lib Arts I | $\begin{gathered} 121 \\ 13.4 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 160 \\ 12.1 \% \end{gathered}$ | Rocky <br> Mountains | $\begin{gathered} 28 \\ 3.1 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 36 \\ 2.7 \% \end{gathered}$ |
| Pct Revenues from Tuition | 46.3\% | 46.5\% | Lib Arts II | $\begin{gathered} 272 \\ 30.1 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 430 \\ 32.6 \% \end{gathered}$ | Far West | $\begin{gathered} 79 \\ 8.8 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 119 \\ 9.0 \% \end{gathered}$ |

Table 2a
State of Shared Governance

| Question | All | Public | Private | Large <br> Privates | Liberal <br> Arts (pri) | Admin | Fac. Rep | AAUP |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Faculty participation | $3.30 \%$ | $2.92 \%$ | $3.55 \%$ | 2.71 | $3.7 \%$ | $3.36 \%$ | $3.31 \%$ | $2.95 \%$ |
| Campus relations |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cooperative | $52.9 \%$ | $50.4 \%$ | $54.5 \%$ | $49.4 \%$ | $57.9 \%$ | $62.1 \%$ | $46.9 \%$ | $28.5 \%$ |
| Conflict but <br> collegial | $40.6 \%$ | $41.7 \%$ | $39.9 \%$ | $41.9 \%$ | $38.6 \%$ | $35.0 \%$ | $43.8 \%$ | $57.8 \%$ |
| Adversarial | $6.5 \%$ | $7.9 \%$ | $5.6 \%$ | $8.7 \%$ | $3.5 \%$ | $2.9 \%$ | $9.3 \%$ | $13.8 \%$ |
| Number of <br> Presidents (last 30 yrs) <br> Unionized faculty | 4.2 | 4.6 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 4.0 | NA* | NA | NA |

* Not applicable

Table 2b
Chief Executive Backgrounds

|  | All | Public | Private | Lib Arts I Colleges | Lib Arts II Colleges |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pct with a Ph.D. (pct listing other doctorate) | 72.8 (14.2) | 77.4 (10.4) | 69.9 (16.6) | 77.1 (11.4) | 64.1 (19.6) |
| Field of degree |  |  |  |  |  |
| Liberal arts | 47.1 | 49.5 | 45.7 | 61.5 | 39.0 |
| Education | 25.9 | 23.9 | 27.2 | 17.3 | 35.7 |
| Business | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 5.5 |
| Law | 5.2 | 6.9 | 4.1 | 6.7 | 2.2 |
| Theology | 6.2 | 0.4 | 9.9 | 6.7 | 9.9 |
| Other (includes engineering) | 11.2 | 15.22 | 8.6 | 7.7 | 7.7 |
| President served as tenured professor | 61.4 | 77.1 | 51.4 | 54.8 | 44.3 |

Table 2c
Changes in the Distribution of Power (in pct)

|  |  | All | Public | Private | Liberal Arts (pri) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Governing board | More | 21.4 | 29.7 | 16.1 | 16.5 |
|  | Same | $74.3$ | $65.9$ | 79.6 | 80.6 |
|  | Less | 4.3 |  | 4.2 | 2.9 |
| President | More | 21.3 | 26.0 | 18.3 | 16.0 |
|  | Same | 74.4 | 68.4 | 78.3 | 80.0 |
|  | Less | 4.3 | 5.6 | 3.5 | 3.9 |
| Dean \& others heads | More | 37.9 | 33.5 | 40.8 | 39.8 |
|  | Same | 56.6 | $60.0$ | 54.4 | 55.8 |
|  | Less | 5.5 | 6.6 | 4.8 |  |
| Dept. chairs | More | 23.5 | 23.5 | 23.5 | 22.9 |
|  | Same | $67.8$ | 68.8 | 67.1 | 66.9 |
|  | Less | 8.7 | 7.7 | 9.4 | 10.3 |
| Faculty gov bodies | More | 35.5 | 32.3 | 37.5 | 34.4 |
|  | Same | 56.5 | 59.1 | 54.9 | 57.8 |
|  | Less | 8.0 | 8.6 | 7.6 | 7.8 |
| State Coordinating Board | More | N.A. | 30.8 | N.A. | N.A. |
|  | Same |  | 58.1 |  |  |
|  | Less |  | 11.1 |  |  |

Table 2d
Perceptions of Change in the Distribution of Power (in pct)

|  | Admin |  |  | Fac. Rep |  |  | AAUP |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | less | same | more | less | same | more | less | same | more |
| Governing <br> board | 4.1 | 76.8 | 19.1 | 4.2 | 72.1 | 23.6 | 6.4 | 69.1 | 24.6 |
| President | 2.9 | 80.6 | 16.6 | 4.9 | 70.1 | 25.0 | 9.9 | 58.6 | 31.5 |
| Dean \& other <br> div. heads | 2.1 | 61.1 | 36.8 | 8.6 | 52.0 | 39.4 | 10.9 | 51.8 | 37.3 |
| Dept. chairs | 4.4 | 70.8 | 24.7 | 12.2 | 64.4 | 23.4 | 17.4 | 66.1 | 16.5 |
| Faculty gov. <br> bodies | 2.1 | 63.1 | 34.8 | 11.5 | 49.9 | 38.6 | 26.4 | 50.0 | 23.6 |
| State <br> Coordinating <br> Board | 12.1 | 60.5 | 27.4 | 8.8 | 53.7 | 37.6 | 13.66 | 65.3 | 18.4 |

Table 3a
Influence in Decision-Making (in pct)

|  |  | All | Public | Private | Liberal Arts (pri) | Private Research | Public Research |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Influence of the Faculty Senate | Advisory <br> Policy influence Policy making | 16.2 | 19.8 | 13.8 | 11.4 | 25.6 | 18.25 |
|  |  | 68.1 | 66.3 | 69.3 | 67.1 | 72.1 | 63.49 |
|  |  | 15.8 | 14.0 | 17.0 | 21.5 | 2.3 | 18.25 |
| ROLES in BUDGET MAKING |  | All | Public | Private | Liberal Arts (pri) | Private Research | Public Research |
| Governing board | Not much <br> Somewhat <br> A lot | 38.1 | 52.5 | 29.0 | 26.1 | 48.8 | 54.9 |
|  |  | 37.9 | 27.0 | 44.8 | 46.4 | 34.9 | 19.7 |
|  |  | 24.0 | 20.5 | 26.2 | 27.6 | 16.3 | 25.4 |
| President | Not much <br> Somewhat <br> A lot | 5.6 | 8.8 | 3.6 | 2.6 | 8.9 | 12.6 |
|  |  | 27.3 | 28.1 | 26.8 | 24.1 | 33.3 | 29.9 |
|  |  | 67.1 | 63.1 | 69.7 | 73.4 | 57.8 | 57.5 |
| Dean \& others heads | Not much <br> Somewhat <br> A lot | 0.9 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
|  |  | 18.0 | 21.4 | 15.9 | 11.6 | 17.8 | 17.3 |
|  |  | 81.0 | 78.0 | 83.0 | 87.2 | 82.2 | 82.7 |
| Dept. chairs | Not much <br> Somewhat <br> A lot | 12.5 | 12.01 | 12.8 | 8.8 | 29.6 | 10.5 |
|  |  | 58.6 | 61.5 | 56.7 | 60.6 | 43.2 | 59.7 |
|  |  | 28.9 | 26.4 | 30.5 | 30.6 | 27.3 | 29.8 |
| Faculty at department level | Not much <br> Somewhat <br> A lot | 46.8 | 53.4 | 42.6 | 37.7 | 72.1 | 59.4 |
|  |  | 48.4 | 42.7 | 52.1 | 56.7 | 27.9 | 38.2 |
|  |  | 4.8 | 3.9 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 0.0 | 2.4 |
| Faculty at institutional level | Not much <br> Somewhat <br> A lot | 44.5 | 45.4 | 43.8 | 44.3 | 55.8 | 43.2 |
|  |  | 46.7 | 47.5 | 46.3 | 45.8 | 37.2 | 48.0 |
|  |  | 8.8 | 7.1 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 7.0 | 8.8 |
| Students | Not much <br> Somewhat <br> A lot | 78.9 | 75.3 | 81.2 | 80.1 | 90.5 | 78.2 |
|  |  | 20.1 | 23.6 | 17.82 | 19.1 | 7.1 | 20.2 |
|  |  | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 2.4 | 1.6 |

Table 3b
Perceptions of Influence in Decision Making (in pct)

|  | Administration |  |  | Faculty Representative |  | AAUP Chapter |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| POLICY <br> INFLUENCE | Advisory | Policy <br> influence | Policy <br> making | Advisory | Policy <br> influence | Policy <br> making | Advisory | Policy <br> influence | Policy <br> making |  |
| Faculty Senate | 14.8 | 70.3 | 15.0 | 16.1 | 66.1 | 17.8 | 24.6 | 64.9 | 10.5 |  |
| ROLES in <br> BUDGET - <br> MAKING | Not much | Somewhat | A lot | Not much | Somewhat | A lot | Not much | Somewhat | A lot |  |
| Governing <br> board | 44.7 | 37.2 | 18.1 | 31.6 | 38.4 | 30.0 | 30.9 | 40.0 | 29.1 |  |
| President | 6.1 | 30.4 | 63.5 | 5.5 | 24.6 | 69.9 | 2.6 | 22.6 | 74.8 |  |
| Dean \& other <br> div. heads | 0.3 | 12.5 | 87.3 | 1.90 | 22.6 | 75.6 | 0.0 | 28.7 | 71.3 |  |
| Dept. chairs | 7.4 | 55.8 | 36.8 | 15.9 | 61.5 | 22.6 | 25.9 | 59.8 | 14.3 |  |
| Faculty at |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dept Level | 34.2 | 58.7 | 7.0 | 54.8 | 42.0 | 3.1 | 80.5 | 19.47 | 0.0 |  |
| Faculty at Inst. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Level | 38.2 | 50.6 | 11.2 | 49.3 | 43.2 | 7.5 | 56.6 | 41.6 | 1.8 |  |
| Students | 73.7 | 24.9 | 1.3 | 82.3 | 17.0 | 0.7 | 92.0 | 7.1 | 0.9 |  |

## Table 3c

2001 Responses to 1970 Survey Questions
Percent of faculty with determinative authority or having authority jointly shared with the administration

|  | Faculty Status | All Inst. | Public | Large Private | Liberal Arts Colleges | Admin. | Fac. Rep. | AAUP Chptr |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Appointments of full-time faculty | 69.9 | 69.0 | 71.7 | 69.8 | 74.0 | 65.8 | 65.8 |
| 2 | Tenure promotions for faculty | 66.1 | 66.0 | 67.8 | 65.0 | 68.5 | 62.7 | 68.5 |
|  | Academic Operation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | Decisions about the content of the curriculum | 89.9 | 88.6 | 88.8 | 92.0 | 91.5 | 89.3 | 83.0 |
| 4 | Setting degree requirements | 87.5 | 84.4 | 87.1 | 91.2 | 89.8 | 86.5 | 79.5 |
|  | Academic Planning and Policy |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | Types of degrees offered | 73.4 | 70.9 | 74.6 | 75.3 | 75.5 | 73.0 | 63.0 |
| 6 | Relative sizes of the faculty of various disciplines | 35.0 | 31.8 | 35.1 | 38.3 | 39.9 | 31.3 | 24.0 |
| 7 | Construction programs for buildings and other facilities | 8.6 | 8.8 | 7.5 | 9.0 | 11.1 | 6.6 | 3.0 |
| 8 | Setting of the average teaching loads | 38.7 | 41.4 | 40.0 | 37.0 | 44.5 | 33.0 | 32.8 |
|  | Selection of Administrators and Department Chair |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9 | Appointing the academic dean | 31.2 | 33.3 | 31.3 | 28.8 | 36.5 | 26.5 | 23.0 |
| 10 | Appointing department chairs or heads | 51.6 | 56.2 | 52.7 | 45.8 | 55.4 | 49.1 | 41.1 |
|  | Financial Planning and Policy |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11 | Setting faculty salary scales | 19.2 | 24.1 | 17.2 | 15.2 | 21.2 | 17.5 | 15.5 |
| 12 | Decisions about individual faculty salaries | 17.1 | 23.3 | 15.4 | 11.5 | 19.4 | 15.0 | 13.8 |
| 13 | Short range budgetary planning | 17.6 | 17.1 | 17.2 | 18.6 | 21.6 | 15.2 | 6.3 |
|  | Organization of Faculty Agencies |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14 | Decisions that establish the authority of faculty in campus governance | 60.4 | 62.7 | 58.6 | 59.1 | 61.5 | 61.5 | 48.7 |
| 15 | Selecting members for institution-wide committees, senate, and similar agencies | 77.6 | 77.1 | 78.0 | 77.8 | 78.2 | 77.8 | 72.3 |

* Mean Faculty Control = Sum of response for Joint Action and Faculty Determination.
N.B. The 1970 survey categorized five decision-making styles or approaches to governance in higher education, ranging from faculty authority and determination over an issue to no faculty participation in governance. It recognized that on some campuses some of the faculty might be in departments characterized by a good deal of faculty participation while in other divisions of the campus faculty would have little say in governance matters. The survey asked respondents to estimate the percentage of faculty whose participation in governance could be categorized by these governance forms in each of a number of critical decision areas.

Survey question: For each of the decisions listed, please indicate in the relevant box the percentage of faculty whose participation in the decision takes the form indicated. For each question, focus on the practice of the last 5 years. Note that the sum of the figures in each row should be $100 \%$ for quest. 1-15.

## Glossary for Table 3a

Definitions for decision styles from the 1970 Survey:

Determination: Determination means that the faculty of an academic unit or its duly authorized representatives have final legislative or operational authority with respect to the policy or action, and any other technically required approvals or concurrences are only pro forma.

Joint Action: Joint action means that formal agreement by both the faculty and other components of the institution is required for confirmatory action or policy determination. Negative action can be accomplished by a veto by either faculty or administration \& the board. The separate components need not act simultaneously but should act within a reasonable time interval. In no case should the interval be longer than an academic year.

Consultation: Consultation means that there is a formal procedure or established practice which provides a means for the faculty (as a whole or through authorized representatives) to present its judgment in the form of a recommendation, vote or other expression sufficiently explicit to record the position or positions taken by the faculty. This explicit expression of faculty judgment must take place prior to the actual making of the decision in question. Initiative for the expression of faculty judgment may come from the faculty, the administration, or the board.

Discussion: Discussion means that there is only an informal expression of opinion from the faculty or from individual faculty members; or that there is formally expressed opinion only from administratively selected committees.

None: None means that there is no faculty participation. In cases where the specific item is lacking, e.g. there is no long-range budgetary planning or where the item is mandated say by the state legislature, e.g. admission requirements for some state schools, then the form of faculty participation is none.

Table 4a
Governing Board Practices

|  | All | Public | Private | Liberal Arts <br> colleges (pri) | Private <br> Comprehensives |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Board mtg. frequency | 4.9 | 7.4 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.5 |
| Exec. Comm mtg. frequency | 3.9 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.2 |
| President votes in the board | $38.2 \%$ | $2.7 \%$ | $60.7 \%$ | $57.7 \%$ | $66.7 \%$ |
| Avg. number of members | 24.8 | 13.2 | 32.1 | 31.1 | 32.1 |
| Number of members prescribed | $83.9 \%$ | $77.9 \%$ | $87.6 \%$ | $85.7 \%$ | $88.2 \%$ |
| Faculty or student members | $28.8 \%$ | $53.9 \%$ | $13.2 \%$ | $14.5 \%$ | $13.7 \%$ |
| Change in faculty/student <br> membership policy* <br> Decrease <br> Increase | $1.4 \%$ <br> $12.2 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ | $1.1 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ |

* Change in last 10 years.


## Table 4b

Governing Board Selection Methods*

|  | All | Public | Private | Lib. Arts <br> colleges <br> (pri) | Comp I <br> \& II (pri) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Selected by governing board (self - perpetuating) | $56.90 \%$ | $5.72 \%$ | $89.17 \%$ | $87.54 \%$ | $91.37 \%$ |
| Selected \& confirmed by governor or state bodies | $35.81 \%$ | $90.24 \%$ | $1.49 \%$ | $1.04 \%$ | $1.44 \%$ |
| Alumni election | $12.24 \%$ | $6.40 \%$ | $15.92 \%$ | $20.07 \%$ | $5.76 \%$ |
| Internal election ( e.g. campus election for student rep) | $5.73 \%$ | $4.71 \%$ | $6.37 \%$ | $9.00 \%$ | $2.88 \%$ |
| Outside election (e.g. state election) | $3.52 \%$ | $3.37 \%$ | $3.61 \%$ | $4.84 \%$ | $1.44 \%$ |
| Selected by the president | $4.17 \%$ | $0.34 \%$ | $6.58 \%$ | $6.23 \%$ | $8.63 \%$ |
| Selected by church body | $10.55 \%$ | $0.00 \%$ | $17.20 \%$ | $22.15 \%$ | $11.51 \%$ |
| Other | $4.43 \%$ | $4.04 \%$ | $4.67 \%$ | $3.81 \%$ | $5.76 \%$ |

*Respondents could select more than one response so percentages will not add to $100 \%$.
Table 4c
Characteristics of Public Institution's Governing Boards

| President deals most often with: | \% | Tuition levels set by | \% | Revenues from tuition | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| a) Statewide board | 18.7 | a) Institution or gov. board | 35.8 | a) Retained by institution | 73.5 |
| b) System board | 45.9 | b) System board | 33.5 | b) Retained at state bd. level | 5.5 |
| c) Campus based board | 35.4 | c) State board | 12.7 | c) Deps'd in state tuition accounts | 12.4 |
| Faculty are employees of |  | d) Legislature or governor | 14.3 | d) Deps'd in state general funds | 5.5 |
| a) State or commonwealth <br> b) Institution | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 48.1 \\ & 51.9 \end{aligned}$ | e) Other | 2.6 | e) Other | 3.1 |

Table 5a
Administration/Faculty Interactions in Governance (in pct)

|  | All | Public | Private | Lib Arts |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Union leaders allowed to serve in governance? | $92.3 \%$ | $88.5 \%$ | $93.4 \%$ | $\bullet$ |
| Administrator chairs faculty governing body | $26.6 \%$ | $9.8 \%$ | $37.4 \%$ | $48.5 \%$ |
| Administrator votes in faculty governance body | $40.3 \%$ | $32.5 \%$ | $45.3 \%$ | $51.8 \%$ |

## Table 5b

Means of Faculty Representation in Governance

| Primary point at which Faculty influence is felt | All | Pub | Pri | Selection methods for faculty gov. body | All | Pub | Pri | Full voting rights in governance awarded to | All | Pub | $\begin{gathered} \text { Pri } \\ \text { Univ } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Lib } \\ \text { Arts } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Department level | 12.6 | 16.0 | 10.3 | Central admin | 2.3 | 1.1 | 3.1 | Faculty above a certain rank | 2.9 | 4.3 | 3.0 | 1.8 |
| Division level | 10.5 | 7.8 | 12.2 | Full faculty vote | 49.8 | 25.7 | 65.4 | Faculty who have tenure | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.2 |
| Institutional level through gov. body | 72.3 | 69.0 | 74.4 | College or div. vote | 30.6 | 47.3 | 19.7 | Tenure track or tenured faculty | 16.4 | 26.1 | 18.7 | 5.9 |
| Faculty bargaining unit | 3.2 | 5.6 | 1.7 | Department chair | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | Full time faculty | 57.9 | 43.7 | 63.1 | 68.9 |
| None of the above | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.3 | Department vote | 9.0 | 19.0 | 2.6 | Faculty in bargaining unit | 2.6 | 4.8 | 2.6 | 0.2 |
|  |  |  |  | Other | 8.1 | 6.8 | 9.0 | All faculty voting rights in gov. | 19.6 | 20.0 | 11.9 | 23.0 |

Table 5c
Institutions of Governance ${ }^{\ddagger}$

|  | All | Public | Private <br> universities | Lib Arts <br> colleges |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Regular Mtgs. of the full faculty | $72.5 \%$ | $45.9 \%$ | $78.9 \%$ | $96.7 \%$ |
| Institution-wide Faculty senate | $58.6 \%$ | $72.3 \%$ | $65.3 \%$ | $39.0 \%$ |
| Institution-wide Academic* senate | $16.2 \%$ | $23.3 \%$ | $14.5 \%$ | $9.5 \%$ |
| Division level units of governance | $45.6 \%$ | $49.4 \%$ | $53.1 \%$ | $36.0 \%$ |
| System-wide faculty senate | $29.0 \%$ | $37.7 \%$ | $19.4 \%$ | $4.4 \%$ |
| System wide academic* senate | $3.3 \%$ | $3.0 \%$ | $4.2 \%$ | $4.4 \%$ |
| Do faculty sit on major policy committees? (e.g. <br> budget, promotions, academic policy) | $98.0 \%$ | $96.5 \%$ | $99.1 \%$ | $98.8 \%$ |

$\ddagger$ Numbers do not add to $100 \%$ because multiple responses were possible
*An academic senate is distinguished from a faculty senate by having senators elected from among the administration, the faculty, students and staff.

Kaplan, Gabriel Report from the 2001 Survey of Higher Education Governance

Table 6a
Major Policies \& Reforms

|  | All | Public | Private <br> universities | Lib Arts <br> Colleges | Research I <br> (Carn Class) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Presidential training | $86.9 \%$ | $88.5 \%$ | $84.7 \%$ | $86.7 \%$ | $56.5 \%$ |
| Performance review relative to a peer group? | $87.4 \%$ | $87.7 \%$ | $89.3 \%$ | $86.0 \%$ | $93.8 \%$ |
| Merit pay | $56.2 \%$ | $72.6 \%$ | $51.9 \%$ | $42.0 \%$ | $94.9 \%$ |
| Tenure | $90.2 \%$ | $97.6 \%$ | $89.4 \%$ | $83.3 \%$ | $98 \%$ |
| Post Tenure review | $63.0 \%$ | $75.3 \%$ | $55.2 \%$ | $55.0 \%$ | $67.3 \%$ |
| Formal academic freedom statement | $97.3 \%$ | $96.2 \%$ | $98.3 \%$ | $97.9 \%$ | $98.0 \%$ |

Table 6b
Diffusion of Major Policies \& Reforms, by regions

|  | New <br> England | Mid East | Great <br> Lakes | Plains | South- <br> east | South- <br> west | Mountains | Far <br> West |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Presidential training | 76.6 | 81.6 | 90.5 | 93.8 | 91.0 | 83.0 | 88.0 | 83.3 |
| Performance review <br> relative to a peer <br> group? | 94.0 | 92.2 | 85.5 | 87.7 | 84.7 | 83.0 | 84.0 | 86.6 |
| Merit pay | 47.8 | 47.6 | 55.6 | 40.5 | 65.0 | 76.6 | 70.8 | 56.7 |
| Tenure | 81.2 | 95.1 | 89.4 | 93.8 | 88.7 | 85.4 | 88.0 | 93.9 |
| Post Tenure review | 50.7 | 53.5 | 54.9 | 66.2 | 66.0 | 72.9 | 84.0 | 81.8 |
| Formal academic <br> freedom statement | 97.0 | 95.6 | 97.6 | 97.5 | 98.0 | 97.9 | 100.0 | 97.0 |

Table 7a
Response to Challenges: Faculty Recruitment (in pct)

|  | All | Public | Private | Private <br> universities |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Would the dept recruit faculty at higher salary <br> Yes, regularly do that | 14.5 | 23.63 | 7.9 | 14.2 |
| Occasionally do that | 52.6 | 55.13 | 51.0 | 54.1 |
| No we rarely do that | 33.3 | 21.3 | 41.1 | 31.7 |
| Would there be pressure to raise others salary? | 54.5 | 59.7 | 50.8 | 51.7 |
| If yes, would the institution raise salaries? |  |  |  |  |
| Very likely | 2.6 | 1.4 | 3.6 | 3.8 |
| Somewhat likely | 15.0 | 13.6 | 16.1 | 15.7 |
| Hard to say | 32.3 | 31.0 | 33.4 | 34.1 |
| Somewhat unlikely | 28.3 | 31.0 | 26.2 | 26.5 |
| Not likely at all | 21.7 | 23.0 | 20.6 | 20.0 |

## Table 7b

Response to Challenges: Department Closures

|  | All | Public | Private | Private universities | Lib. Arts College |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Was a department closed in last five years | 43.2\% | 44.7\% | 42.2\% | 51.4\% | 36.2 |
| Avg number of closures or mergers | 2.2 | 2.9 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 1.2 |
| Reasons that made decision DIFFICULT |  |  |  |  |  |
| a) Institution-wide faculty concerns about the closure | 37.29\% | 37.23 | 37.29 | 38.01 | 36.6 |
| b) Faculty resistance in that department | 47.89\% | 51.24 | 45.76 | 49.12 | 42.6 |
| c) Student concerns about the closure | 33.22\% | 28.87 | 36.16 | 30.41 | 41.5 |
| d) Alumni concerns about the closure | 11.13\% | 8.36 | 12.99 | 11.70 | 14.2 |
| e) Concerns that closure might violate tenure or academic freedom provisions | 5.39\% | 4.18 | 6.21 | 7.02 | 5.5 |
| f) Concerns about the public perception of this closure and damage to the institution's reputation | 26.48\% | 24.69 | 27.68 | 25.73 | 29.5 |
| Reasons that made decision NECESSARY | All | Public | Private | Private Universities | Lib. Arts Colleges |
| a) Enrollment levels in the years preceding the decision | 74.20\% | 71.55 | 75.99 | 71.34 | 80.3 |
| b) Direction from the Board or an Administrator that the institution should re-orient itself | 32.21\% | 31.38 | 32.76 | 29.82 | 35.5 |
| c) Other institutions had closed or scaled back activities in this area | 3.37\% | 2.51 | 3.95 | 4.09 | 3.8 |
| d) Declining numbers of department faculty members and a deficiency of replacements | 18.38\% | 18.82 | 18.08 | 19.88 | 16.4 |
| e) Faculty demands for resources in other fields and departments | 29.17\% | 27.62 | 30.22 | 27.49 | 32.7 |
| f) Student demands for resources in other areas of the institution | 13.32\% | 17.15 | 10.73 | 11.11 | 10.4 |

Table 7c
Response to Challenges: Responding to Student Needs \& Demands

| Major institutional change to meet student needs results <br> most frequently from response to: | All | Public | Private | Private <br> Universities |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The student representative body | 24.3 | 28.9 | 21.3 | 19.6 |
| Student protest or petitions | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.1 |
| The market-place | 48.7 | 43.9 | 51.8 | 54.1 |
| None of the above | 23.4 | 23.6 | 23.2 | 23.2 |

## Table 7d

Response to Challenges: Setting Missions and Policy Goals

|  | All | Public | Private |  <br> II | Private <br> Res I \& II <br> Doc I \& II |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Enrollment | $26.35 \%$ | $26.20 \%$ | $26.44 \%$ | $29.48 \%$ | $13.16 \%$ |
| Finance | $39.24 \%$ | $28.41 \%$ | $45.98 \%$ | $48.13 \%$ | $34.21 \%$ |
| Management | $47.88 \%$ | $41.70 \%$ | $51.72 \%$ | $54.10 \%$ | $47.37 \%$ |
| Public service | $25.78 \%$ | $39.85 \%$ | $17.01 \%$ | $17.16 \%$ | $23.68 \%$ |
| Quality | $78.90 \%$ | $84.50 \%$ | $75.40 \%$ | $73.88 \%$ | $81.58 \%$ |
| Traditional values <br> (academic or spiritual) | $23.80 \%$ | $12.18 \%$ | $31.03 \%$ | $31.72 \%$ | $23.68 \%$ |

Table 8a
Changes in Faculty Participation Since 1970

|  | Faculty Status | Mean Faculty Control in 1970 | Mean Faculty Control 2001 (matched inst.) | Mean Faculty Control 1970 (matched inst.) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Appointments of full-time faculty | 30.68 | 72.76 | 30.57 |
| 2 | Tenure promotions for faculty | 35.36 | 68.10 | 35.08 |
|  | Academic Operation |  |  |  |
| 3 | Decisions about the content of the curriculum | 81.82 | 90.30 | 83.26 |
| 4 | Setting degree requirements | 81.21 | 88.17 | 82.96 |
|  | Academic Planning and Policy |  |  |  |
| 5 | Types of degrees offered | 71.25 | 73.46 | 72.44 |
| 6 | Relative sizes of the faculty of various disciplines | 9.99 | 33.15 | 9.04 |
| 7 | Construction programs for buildings and other facilities | 7.09 | 8.08 | 7.10 |
| 8 | Setting of the average teaching loads | 23.65 | 38.60 | 23.95 |
|  | Selection of Administrators and Department Chair |  |  |  |
| 9 | Appointing the academic dean | 13.48 | 29.70 | 13.26 |
| 10 | Appointing department chairs or heads | 21.86 | 53.19 | 21.36 |
|  | Financial Planning and Policy |  |  |  |
| 11 | Setting faculty salary scales | 6.15 | 19.05 | 5.08 |
| 12 | Decisions about individual faculty salaries (refer to dept. chairs in glossary) | 6.94 | 17.51 | 6.53 |
| 13 | Short range budgetary planning | 4.40 | 16.27 | 4.30 |
|  | Organization of Faculty Agencies |  |  |  |
| 14 | Decisions that establish the authority of faculty in campus governance | 45.91 | 62.08 | 44.66 |
| 15 | Selecting members for institution-wide committees, senate, and similar agencies | 59.78 | 78.66 | 59.31 |

* Mean Faculty Control = Sum of response for Joint Action and Faculty Determination.


## Table 8b

Distribution of Responses from 1970 to 2001
1970 value stated first, then 2001 figure in bold (means for all institutions in both surveys) Note: Figures may not add to 100 because of rounding



[^0]:    * Kaplan is a doctoral candidate at Harvard University in public policy and will assume the position of assistant professor of public affairs at the University of Colorado's Graduate School of Public Affairs this fall. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations, the American Association of University Professors and Professor Emeritus Otway Pardee whose assistance and support made this project possible. All views expressed in this paper are strictly the author's.

[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ For examples see Reisman \& Jencks, 1968; Trow 1976; Blau, 1973; Baldridge, 1971; Pfeffer \& Salancik, 1974.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ TDM breaks down the steps of survey work into pieces and considers how each step in the process can be approached to maximize survey response. The survey instrument itself should look attractive and have a colorful cover. It should have official sanction that communicates the importance of the project and the breadth and gravity of support from the project within the respondent's population. Prior to providing the survey, the respondent should receive a personalized letter introducing the survey, notifying of its pending arrival and asking for the respondent's participation in completing the form. The survey can then be sent a short while later. Before the survey deadline, an attempt should be made to contact the population once or twice to remind respondents about the deadline and again ask for the forms to be completed and returned. Such protocols have been associated with marked improvements in survey response rates. While the average survey response rate has been found to be $28 \%$, utilizing this method has garnered, depending on the survey and the difficulty of the survey task, response rates between $40 \%$ and $80 \%$.
    ${ }^{3}$ Available on the web at http://caspar.nsf.gov.
    ${ }^{4}$ Since the contemporary survey was to incorporate questions from the AAUP's governance survey of 1971, permission to use the prior survey was sought from AAUP's Committee T (The Committee on Governance) and they eagerly provided immediate support for the project. The American Council of Academic Deans (ACAD) also agree to support the project and add its name to the sponsor list. The cooperation of these two groups was essential in communicating to respondents both the serious nature of the research and the national scope of the project.

[^3]:    ${ }^{5}$ If this seems confusing or contradictory, consider the following example. If one group is excluded from a national census, the population of mentally ill homeless people for instance, the census can still provide a representative sample of the remaining groups of the population since their increased likelihood of being sampled is distributed across all of the other groups. See the survey report for a fuller statement of the response ratios from all Carnegie classes.

[^4]:    ${ }^{6}$ The survey also allowed respondents the opportunity to provide written commentary on the issues raised in the questionnaire and about half of the respondents chose to provide additional written comments about the state of governance on their campus. These answers have yet to be reviewed, however, so a more nuanced picture of oncampus relations remains to be drawn.

[^5]:    ${ }^{7}$ To maintain the survey's amenability for respondents, the questions from the 1971 effort were trimmed from 31 to 15 by measuring the correlations among answers and discarding those questions whose answers were highly correlated and unlikely to produce information that could not be gained by asking only one question.

[^6]:    8 The 'Redbook' refers to an AAUP publication encompassing all documents and statements about academic policies and practices issued by that organization. It is republished periodically. It was recently re-released but this discussion refers to statements in the 1995 edition. AAUP Policy Documents \& Reports, 1995 edition. (Washington DC: American Association of University Professors self-published document)

[^7]:    ${ }^{9}$ Two different readers read these responses independently and then compared their categories, discussing any disagreements until they could arrive at an agreed upon category. This led to a listing of 35 different categories of free response from institutions.

[^8]:    10 Not shown in Table 8d since this does not count the incidence of objectives may have been reported twice by an institution but were then grouped under the same thematic heading. Table 8 d only counts the number of institutions that gave at least one response that was classified according to that thematic category.

[^9]:    ${ }^{11}$ This finding supports the conclusion of Adler, who in 1977 ran a replication of the 1970 AAUP survey and concluded that faculty participation in governance had increased over those 7 years. He attributed this change to the rise in faculty collective bargaining at many institutions.

